After his stellar start against the Dodgers tonight, allowing only one earned run in seven innings of work, Diamondbacks starter Billy Buckner has a 2.37 ERA in three starts against Los Angeles so far this season.

Against all other teams the rest of the year, however, his ERA is an unsightly 7.85.

What should the Mariners do with Ken Griffey Jr. next season? The fans love Junior, and the Mariners love his positive impact in the clubhouse, but his declining performance hinders the ability of an otherwise pretty decent team to contend for a postseason berth.

Steve Kelley of the Seattle Times speaks to some of the value Griffey has had in the clubhouse this season:

He has been the godfather to the parade of young players who have come into the clubhouse. He has been a close friend to the veterans. He has offered advice on pitchers’ and hitters’ tendencies….

He has been good for the club, good for the city and great to have around again.

The thing is, there is a perfectly good way for the Mariners to get all of these benefits without wasting precious at-bats on him: they should simply make him a coach.  They could even pay him the exact same salary, if they think he is that worth it, but please, don’t waste precious at bats on a guy which could be given to better performers just because you like the advice he gives to younger players or his friendly presence in the dugout.

That’s the sensible part of my plan for Griffey. Now here is the slightly crazy part.

The Mariners should sign Griffey to a $1 million “personal services” contract or whatever, and then use him as a coach.  He’s not on the active roster, but he travels with the team, wears a uniform, sits in the dugout, gives advice, etc.  And as long as the Mariners are in contention, they should only put their very best players on the field.

But if Griffey is still interested in playing, here’s what you do.  Let him play in spring training. Let him take batting practice with the team during the season if he wants to. And then, if the Mariners actually do actually fall so far out of contention that they can’t possibly come back, the team should cut its worst player and install Griffey as the DH.  Or else, when the rosters expand in September, add Griffey to the 40-man and put him on the team for a few at-bats down the stretch.

Look, this plan is pretty silly, but if Griffey is already under contract as a coach, the only thing he really costs you is a roster spot, and only a 40-man roster spot at that, if you wait until September.  It’s still probably not the optimal use of resources, but in this darkened age of steroids, Ken Griffey Jr. is the one player who has emerged as still being beloved by pretty much the entire nation, and if he still wants to play a bit, and the fans still love to watch him (which they do), and the Mariners players and staff all love him, I say let him play a bit.

In any case, it’s a decent compromise with the foolishness of giving him so many at-bats this season when the Mariners actually had a shot at contention.

The emerging consensus around baseball is that former White Sox starting pitcher Jose Contreras is old and just about washed up. Certainly, his traditional stats of a 5-13 ERA and a 5.42 ERA do little to convince you otherwise.

Which is why I was shocked when I looked at Alejandro’s White Sox WAR pie and saw that Contreras has actually been the fifth most productive player on the White Sox this year, with a 2.3 WAR. Clearly some investigation was warranted.

Reports out of Colorado are that GM Dan O’Dowd’s first choice for a replacement starter was Brad Penny, but that manager Jim Tracy, who had had to deal with Penny when he managed the Dodgers, was against acquiring him, so O’Dowd was forced to fall back on Contreras as a second choice.

But looking at Contreras’s FIP this season, it is a mere 4.12, which is significantly better than Brad Penny’s 4.48 FIP when he was signed by the Giants. Indeed, looking at Contreras’s peripherals, they are all right in line with his career norms. In fact, his groundball rate is slightly up, and his line drive and home run rates are slightly down, all of which are good signs for a pitcher.

Well, actually there is one glaring exception. Contreras’s strand rate is at 56.8%, which is one of the lowest strand rates I have ever seen. So basically, Contreras is not letting all that many guys on base, but when he does, almost half of all baserunners score.

Now, some old-school baseball guys might tell you that this is a reflection on the weakness of Contreras’s character, and that he must be somehow “cracking under the pressure” when guys get on base. But given that most stats guys are convinced that strand rate is almost entirely based on luck, and that Contreras’s career mark is a much healthier 67%, a natural conclusion to draw is that the Rockies just got themselves a much better pitcher than they maybe even realized.

The 2003 Los Angeles Dodgers had one of the greatest pitching staffs the game of baseball has ever known. At the height of the steroids era, in a season when 104 players would test positive for performance enhancing drugs, the Dodgers hurlers posted a 3.16 ERA, good enough for an insane 128 team ERA+, and in total allowed a ridiculously low 556 runs.

Kevin Brown, in one of the only good seasons the Dodgers got out of him during the course of the bone-headed 7-year, $105 million contract given to him by Kevin Malone, somehow remained on the field for 32 starts and 211 innings, posting a 2.39 ERA, and Hideo Nomo, in his second go-round with the Dodgers and in the twilight of his career, somehow located the fountain of youth and briefly recaptured his old greatness for one last, shining season, posting 16 victories and a 3.09 ERA.

But the real heart and soul of this team was its bullpen, which was simply the best bullpen I have ever seen. At a time when most teams were already relying on a rotating group of at least 7 relievers out of the pen at any given time, with the Dodgers amazingly gave almost all of their relief innings to only 5 relievers, and the same 5 guys, all season long.  Moreover, the top three relievers, by innings pitched, all posted ERAs in the 1’s.

Eric Gagne, in his single greatest season, and perhaps the greatest season ever by a relief pitcher, racked up 55 saves and posted a 1.20 ERA, while striking out 137 batters in 82.1 innings and posting an incomprehensible 0.69 WHIP. His ERA+ was 335, and he won the NL Cy Young award going away, with a 91% share of the votes. Meanwhile, Guillermo Mota added a 1.97 ERA in 105 innings, and Paul Quantrill chipped in with a 1.75 ERA in 77.1 innings of work. Even the “worst” reliever of the five, Tom Martin, posted an ERA of “only” 3.53 while striking out 51 batters in 51 innings.

So how did this team not even make the playoffs?  Well, in the very same year that the Dodgers had one of the greatest pitching staffs ever, they also posted one of the worst offensive performances in history, scoring a mere 574 runs, and wound up with a record of 85-77. This good enough for second place in the NL West, but was a distant 15.5 games behind the San Francisco Giants, who won 100 games that season behind Barry Bonds and Jeff Kent, and 6 games behind the wild-card Florida Marlins, who would go on to win the World Series.

The stunning lack of offense was actually quite sudden and bizarre, because over the previous three seasons, the Dodgers had averaged 756 runs, and they would average a very similar 755 runs over the following three seasons. But somehow, in 2003, every single hitter on the team had a down year, all at once, and whenever somebody was hitting well they immediately got hurt.

Rightfielder Shawn Green, who had hit 42 and 49 homers the previous two seasons, mysteriously hit only 19 homers in 2003, despite not missing any time, and would never be a power hitter again. Third baseman Adrian Beltre, who the very next season would bat .334 and post a 1.017 OPS, somehow only mustered marks of .240 and and .714. And the Dodgers’ big free agent signee, first baseman Fred McGriff, who had racked up 30 homers and 103 RBI with a healthy .858 OPS just the season before with the Cubs, suddenly aged about 30 years overnight, playing poor defense, losing all of his foot speed, and limping his way to a .249 batting average before the Dodgers finally allowed him to save some face by disabling him.

Outfielders Brian Jordan and Dave Roberts performed well early on, but both got hurt and never recovered, and the Dodgers couldn’t get any production out of fill-ins. Finally, in desperation, they traded three prospects to the Mets for Jeromy Burnitz, and signed Ricky Henderson, both on the same day, July 14. But Burnitz’s OPS, which had been a robust .925 with the Mets, immediately plummeted to .643 for the rest of the season once he entered the becursed Dodgers lineup, and Henderson, at age 44, had almost nothing left, batting .208 and only stealing 3 bases the rest of the way, in what would be the final major league games in his long and storied career.

The final results were dismal. The 2003 Dodgers had a .243 team batting average and a .303 team OBP.  They hit a mere 124 homers, and compiled a .294 team wOBA. Their 574 runs were by far the fewest in all of baseball, 17 runs fewer than the execrable Detroit Tigers, who had lost 119 games.  If the Dodgers had somehow been able to muster even replacement-level offense, they would have been a surefire playoff team, given their inconceivably good pitching, but instead, they were consigned to the dustbin of what-could-have-been.

The Giants and the Rockies are battling it out for the National League wild card, but both teams are refusing to put their best lineup on the field.

Seth Smith is the second best hitter on the Colorado Rockies. In 251 at-bats, he has compiled a .909 OPS, and his .394 wOBA is second on the team only to Todd Helton’s .397. And yet on most nights Smith rides the pine behind obviously inferior hitters like Ryan Spilborghs and Eric Young Jr.

Fred Lewis is the second best hitter on the San Francisco Giants. In 273 AB, he has compiled a .360 OBP, and his .339 wOBA is second on the team only to Pablo Sandoval’s .395. And yet on most nights Fred Lewis rides the pine behind obviously inferior hitters like Nate Schierholtz and Eugenio Velez.

Both of these players are clearly superior to the other options at hand, at this point in the season, and both are the second best hitters on their team, and it’s not particularly close. Plus both players have the pedigree and the at-bats this season to suggest that their numbers are not just a sample size issue. Lewis’s numbers in particular are almost dead on his career marks across the board.

It’s pure foolishness for these two teams which each harbor playoff hopes to both make their second-best hitters sit in crucial stretch-run games. I can’t remember the last time I saw even one contending team do this kind of thing, let alone two.

Everyone is wondering who the “player to be named later” is in the trade that sent Jon Garland to the Dodgers, especially since the Diamondbacks are paying all of Garland’s salary for the rest of this season, plus his $2 million buyout after the season is over, meaning it’s got to be someone good.

One of the rumors out there is that it’s 2B prospect Tony Abreu, and based on a wide array of circumstantial evidence, I’m going to go ahead and say that it’s gotta be Abreu.

First of all we know that it is someone who played for the Dodgers this year, and is still on the 40 man roster. That limits the options quite a bit.

Second of all, we know that Ned Colletti and his cheapskate boss Frank McCourt are not at all afraid to trade a really good player just to save a bit of money. Although the Diamondbacks probably would have taken just about anybody for Garland if the Dodgers paid the rest of his money, it would not be strange to see the Dodgers give away Abreu, despite the fact that he posted a .991 OPS at Triple-A this year, just to save a few million bucks. That would make no sense for most teams, but we’ve seen the Dodgers do stupid shit like this before, as when they “threw in” rock god grade-A catching prospect Carlos Santana into the Casey Blake trade, just to save $2 million.

Third of all, we know that Joe Torre hates Tony Abreu.  And not just hates him in the normal way Joe Torre hates all young players, simply because they are young and not veterans, but in an extra-special, Tony-Abreu-only kind of way. Torre has been badmouthing Abreu to the press ever since spring training 2008, when he was convinced Abreu was faking an injury in what later turned out to be a sports hernia that required surgery.

Finally, we know that the Diamondbacks have a huge hole at second base, with no real options in their system, and after trading away Felipe Lopez, had basically no one to play there, other than taking a gamble that Ryan Roberts is somehow for real.

Nope, it’s gotta be Abreu.

This is what a really good team’s WAR pie looks like:

What immediately jumps out, in looking at the Yankees WAR pie, is how balanced this team is in terms of how many different players have made significant contributions. An amazing 15 players have contributed at least one full win of value so far this season, making most of the slices in this pie nearly equal in size.

The pie also speaks to how lucky the Yankees have been in avoiding injury–only 25 players have combined to provide a ridiculous 48 wins above replacement already this season. Indeed, the Yankees are still on pace to have at least 8 players hit at least 20 home runs this season, which has never happened before in baseball history, and a big reason why is that the starting lineup has been incredibly healthy all year long, with the exception of A-Rod’s hip injury.

The WAR pie also gives lie to the notion that Mark Teixeira has been far and away the obvious MVP candidate this season. Indeed Mark Teixeira hasn’t even been the most valuable player on his own team, and it isn’t even all that close. Derek Jeter’s new flexibility workout regimen and his resultant resurgence on defense plus a hot year at the plate have helped him post MVP-type numbers, and CC Sabathia has been a rock in the rotation.

Another thing this graph underscores is how much more valuable Brett Gardner is in centerfield, over Melky Cabrera. Although their offensive contributions are similar, as Melky has fattened up, he has lost a step or two on defense, whereas Gardiner is one of the premier defenders in center field by most measures.

Finally, a look at the Yankees balance between offense and defense reveals that like the Phillies, the Yankees are heavily reliant on their offense (although not anywhere quite as bad as the Phils’).  However, this chart is heavily affected by the disastrous performance of the Yankees bullpen in the early months of this season, and would probably not look nearly as unbalanced if you based it only on the performances since June…

At the beginning of this season, we asked if putting Joe Torre and Ned Colletti together in the same organization was going to mutually exacerbate both of their well-known predilictions for big-name “experienced veterans.”

Clearly, the answer is a resounding “YES.”

Dangling well-known veteran players in front of Colletti and Torre must be like dangling porn videos in front of Hideki Matsui, because over the past two weeks the Dodgers have gone on a wild spree of acquiring big-name veterans, trading at least 4 prospects and putting down at least $7.5 million dollars combined to acquire Vicente Padilla, Ronnie Belliard, Jon Garland, and Jim Thome.

None of this makes any sense, no matter which way you slice it.

First of all, the Dodgers still have the best record in the entire National League. Yes, that’s right, best record in the whole league. They are a mortal lock for the playoffs, because even if the some how lose the division, they will end up with the wild card. So acquiring these guys for the “stretch run” makes no sense.

But at the same time, it’s not like you really need these guys for the playoffs either, when you cut about five guys from your pitching staff. At least, the Dodgers better not be stashing these guys for the playoffs. Because if you are a Dodgers fan you gotta be pretty frightened if Colletti and Torre are planning to make Vicente Padilla and Jon Garland a big part of their playoff plans.

Because the more important point here is, none of these guys are all that good. Ron Belliard has a career OPS of .753, and he’s already on the downside of that. He’s basically Tony Abreu, only 10 years older at 3 times the price. Oh wait, I forgot, he’s an “experienced veteran.”

As for Padilla and Garland, I’m not sure what to say, other than that these guys are scraping the bottom of the replacement level barrel. Padilla struggles to even achieve replacement level, and Garland has hovered just a smidgen above it for most of his career. Are these guys really going to give the Dodgers anything that they couldn’t get from guys they already have, like Charlie Haeger, Eric Stults, and Scott Elbert?

And as useless as the first three guys are, I consider Jim Thome the most useless acquisition of them all. Oh sure, Thome is a probable hall of famer and all, but he hasn’t played an inning in the field in more than two years, and now here he is on a National League team as a glorified pinch hitter. Thome even spoke with Ned Colletti on the phone and explicitly told him that he could only be asked to play first base in an absolute emergency. What use is that on an NL team? You can’t even double switch with him. Is 40 days of that that really worth a whopping 2.5 million dollars PLUS a minor leaguer?

Maybe Matsui has it right. I’m pretty sure you’d get a better return on your investment investing in porno tapes.